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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in this Court pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3 (1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did th& trial court give proper weight to appellee 
Wherryf s testimony? 
2. Did th% trial court properly find that Wherry used his 
"best efforts" tQ> obtain an extension of a lease on behalf of 
appellants? 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellee T.§. wherry and the other appellees commenced this 
action on November 10, 1988 against appellants Wesley F. Sine and 
Melva Sine. Appellees sought damages from the Sines for their 
default and breach of a Stock Purchase Agreement. (See Stock 
Purchase Agreement, attached as Addendum 3). The trial court 
later granted appellees' motion to amend their Complaint to name 
Jerry Sine and DQris Sine as additional defendants following the 
dismissal of their bankruptcy filing. On July 17, 1989, Wesley 
and Melva Sine and Jerry and Doris Sine answered the Amended 
Complaint and asserted as a defense that T.E. Wherry failed to 
use his "best efforts" to obtain a lease eictension on their 
behalf. A counterclaim was also filed on the grounds that T.E. 
Wherry failed to use his "best efforts." 
A bench tri^l was held on March 2 and March 7 of 1990. In 
his opening remarks, appellees1 counsel informed the trial court 
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that appellees were proceeding only against Wesley F. and Melva 
Sine since counsel understood that Jerry and Dora Sine had filed 
their second bankruptcy petition and therefore the action against 
them was stayed pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 
Following trial, the court entered a Judgement on April 2, 
1990, in favor of appellees. The court ordered that appellees 
recover from Wesley F. Sine and Melva Sine $162,964.63, plus 
attorneys fees and costs. The court also dismissed with preju-
dice the Sines' counterclaim. (See District Court's Judgment, 
attached as Addendum 1). From that final judgment, the Sines 
appealled. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 31, 1961, T.E. Wherry ("Wherry"), who is now 
eighty-four years of age, and his now deceased wife, Lucile M. 
Wherry, entered into a ten-year lease agreement with Skaggs 
Properties, Inc. for a building known as the Wasatch Bowling 
Lanes in the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Salt Lake City. (T. 
9-12). The building was eventually purchased from Skaggs Proper-
ties, Inc. prior to the lapse of the ten-year lease by Richard L. 
Skankey, owner of the Olympus Hills Shopping Center. (T. 76-77). 
On May 4, 1971, Skankey and Wherry extended the lease agreement 
to August 31, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the "Wherry 
lease"). (T. 16-17 & 79-80). 
Sometime prior to November 1978, Wherry and Wesley F. Sine 
became acquainted with each other at meetings with the Bowling 
Proprietors Association, where they discussed the Sines' acquir-
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ing the bowling establishment and business. (T. 18-20 & 133-36). 
Sine was an attorney and has been a member of the Utah State Bar 
since 1962. (T. 131, 156). Following negotiations, the parties 
entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement on February 1, 1979 in 
which the Sines agreed to purchase 200 shares of common stock of 
Wasatch Bowling, Inc. (T. 20-22) (See Stock Purchase Agreement, 
attached as Addendum 3). Pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agree-
ment, the Sines agreed to pay $435,000 to Wherry and the other 
appellees as follows: $35,000 on the execution of the Agreement 
and consecutive monthly payments due the first day of each month 
commencing March 1, 1979 and continuing for fifteen years. (T. 
22-24). Following the execution of the Agreement, Wherry and the 
other appellees were released from their lease with Skankey. (T. 
37). 
Paragraph 18 of the Addendum to the Stock Purchase Agreement 
states the following: 
Sellers agree to use their best efforts 
to obtain an extension of the lease mentioned 
in paragraph #4 for a period of an additional 
15 years, to and including the year 1999, on 
the terms and conditions heretofore discussed 
between sellers and the landlord as disclosed 
by sellers to buyers. 
(See Addendum 3). All the parties understood and agreed that 
Wherry was to act for and on behalf of all the sellers or appel-
lees in connection with the Stock Purchase Agreement including 
subsequent negotiations with Skankey regarding the extension of 
the Wherry lease. (See Findings of Fact 1f6, attached as Addendum 
2). 
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The peirties also understood that by "best efforts," Wherry 
was not guciranteeing or making any promises that Skankey would 
grant an extension of the Wherry lease to the Sines or enter into 
a new lease agreement with the Sines on the same terms and 
conditions as previously existed in the Wherry lease. (T. 57 & 
61-62), Sine testified that he was aware as a lawyer that he 
could have, but did not, require language in the Agreement 
mandating that if Wherry was unable to secure the lease extension 
the Agreement would have been voided. (T. 161-62). 
Following several attempts by Wherry to secure an extension 
for the Sines of the Wherry lease, Sine personally negotiated a 
new lease in 1984 for the building with Skankeyfs leasing agent. 
(T. 93 & 168). Sine agreed to spend another $200,000 on improve-
ments in the property and to a rental increase each year thereaf-
ter. (T. 168-170). Sine testified at trial that at no time 
after he negotiated this new lease with Skankey in 1984 did he 
communicate with or notify Wherry that he considered him in 
breach of the Stock Purchase Agreement. (T. 170). And according 
to Skankey, Sine never complained or objected to paying an 
increase in rent because it was more than Wherry paid under his 
lease. (T. 97-98). Skankey further testified that the leasing 
business is dynamic and from 1979 to 1984, lease rates changed 
dramatically. (T. 114). 
The Sines ceased making payments to Wherry in June of 1988 
and fell into arrears for several months. When Wherry brought 
this action, the outstanding balance due under the Stock Purchase 
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Agreement was $162,381.43. (T. 40-42 & 44-46). Sine admitted at 
trial that by June of 1988 he did not intend to make any further 
payments under the Stock Purchase Agreement. (T. 171). The 
Sines' financial difficulties continued and in August of 1989, 
because of rent collection problems, the Sines were evicted from 
the Olympus Hills Shopping Center. (T. 99-100). 
Wherry testified at trial that he felt he had exerted his 
best efforts to obtain an extension for the Sines the terms of 
the Wherry lease. (T. 65-66 & 73). He met with Skankey several 
times and discussed an extension of the Wherry lease and terms 
for the Sines. (T. 25). Both Wherry and Skankey testified that 
they discussed an extension of the Wherry lease for the Sinesf 
beneift initially in August of 1979. (T. 26, 60-62 & 89). 
According to both witnesses, Wherry expressly requested that 
Skankey extend to the Sines the same lease terms that Wherry had. 
(T. 27, 62 & 90). Both witnesses also testified that Wherry and 
Skankey had other discussions regarding a lease extension to the 
Sines after this initial meeting. (T. 29-30 & 91). Wherry 
testified that although he could not remember precise dates, 
there were approximately a half dozen other discussions after 
this first meeting he had with Skankey concerning an extension of 
the Wherry lease terms. (T. 29-36, 61, 63-64). He further 
testified that he had several telephone conversations with 
Skankey during the five year period between their first meeting 
in 1979 and 1984 concerning the extension. (T. 36-37). Skankey 
also testified that he and Wheery had both face to face and 
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telephone discussions after their 1979 meeting regarding extend-
ing the Wherry lease terms to the Sines. (T. 92). 
Wherry and Skankey both testified that they met again in February 
of 1984 to discuss an extension of the Wherry lease terms for the 
Sines. (T. 65, 91-93 & 104). According to these two witnesses, 
Wherry again expressly requested Skankey to extend the same terms 
to the Sines that he had been extended to Wherry. (T. 65, 92 & 
105). Skankey responded that he was negotiating with Wesley Sine 
but that he was not willing to extend the same terms to the 
Sines. (T. 93 & 105). Skankey also testified that at no time 
from 1979 until this law suit did the Sines ask him whether 
Wherry had requested him to extend the Wherry lease terms for the 
Sines' benefit. (T. 94). 
Following trial, the court entered detailed findings of fact 
to support its conclusion that Wherry on behalf of all the 
appellees fully performed his duties and responsibilities under 
the Stock Purchase Agreement and used his best efforts to obtain 
an extension of the Wherry lease terms for the Sines. The court 
also made findings and concluded that the Sines waived any claim 
regarding the failure of Wherry's performance under the Stock 
Purchase Agreement. The court determined therefore that the 
Sines were not justified in withholding payments under the Stock 
Purchase Agreement and their intentional refusal to make future 
payments constituted a breach of the Agreement. (See Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Addendum 2). 
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SUMMARY OF APPELLEES' ARGUMENT 
The Sines' brief on appeal seeking reversal of the trial 
court's judgment is premised on underlying facts taken out of 
context, disregards the broad discretion given to trial courts, 
fails to marshal the evidence and misinterprets clear legal 
principles. 
The Sines' first argument, that the trial court erred in 
weighing Wherry's testimony, ignores the broad discretion afford-
ed the trial court in determining the weight and credibility 
given to a witness. The Sines simply point to one or two isolat-4 
ed inconsistencies in Wherry's testimony that are insignificant 
and wholly irrelevant when put into context with the rest of his 
and Skankey's testimonies. Indeed, the record of the trial 
proceedings shows that Wherry's testimony was internally consis-
tent, credible and harmonious with the testimony of Skankey. 
This Court need not reach the merits of the Sines' second 
argument that Wherry failed to use his "best efforts" as required 
under the Stock Purchase Agreement for two reasons. First, the 
Sines fail to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the findings. In accordance with this Court's 
recent directive regarding the consequence of an appellant 
failing to marshal the evidence, the merits of the Sines' fail-
ure-to-use "best-efforts" contention need not be addressed on 
appeal. Second, the Sines fail to acknowledge or even address 
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the trial court's finding that they knowingly waived any claim 
regarding the failure of Wherry's performance under the Stock 
Purchase Agreement. 
Even if this Court decides to reach the merits of the Sines' 
failure-to--use "best-efforts" claim, the trial court did not err 
in determining that Wherry used his best efforts. The Sines 
misconstrue the case law by suggesting that "best efforts" 
required Wherry to exert himself to extend the lease until all 
efforts had been exhausted. The law is clear that "best efforts" 
is equivalent to "good faith" and requires only a standard of 
conduct that depends on the circumstances of the parties. The 
trial court's uncontested findings of fact show that the trial 
court in fact carefully evaluated and considered the circumstanc-
es in this case before reaching its decision that Wherry used his 
"best efforts." Based on the trial court's findings, there is no 
doubt that Wherry used his "best efforts" in accordance with his 
obligation under the Stock Purchase Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED DISCRETION 
IN FINDING T.E. WHERRY'S TESTIMONY CREDIBLE 
In their first point on appeal, the Sines contend that the 
trial court gave Wherry's testimony too much credence. The court 
found that "the testimony on behalf of the Plaintiffs by the 
Plaintiff T.E. Wherry was believable, credible, forthright and 
honest." (See Finding of Fact 1f9, attached as Addendum 2). The 
Sines assert that Skankey's testimony should have been afforded 
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much greater weight than Wherry's since Skankey was a so-called 
adverse witness and that Wherry's testimony is suspect given 
certain inconsistencies and his inability to recall exact dates. 
A. It is the Trial Court's Discretion to Deter-
mine the Weight or Credibility of a Witness 
The law is clear that it is not the function of appellate 
courts to determine the credibility of the witnesses. State v. 
Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). Broad discretion is 
afforded trial courts in determining the weight and credibility 
given to a witness. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides 
that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah Rule Civ. 
Proc. 52(a) (1991). And the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
"[d]eciding whether a witness is believable and determining what 
weight to assign a witness's testimony are matters within the 
discretion of the finder of fact." Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 
60 (Utah 1987). 
B. The Sines Fail to Show that the Trial Court 
Abused its Discretion in Finding Wherry's 
Testimony Credible 
The Sines' "inescapable conclusion" that Skankey's testimony 
should be afforded greater weight than Wherry's testimony pre-
sumes, without any support from the record, that the court in 
fact ascribed lesser credence to Skankey's testimony. There is 
no evidence anywhere in the record that the court afforded 
Skankeyfs testimony less weight. Moreover, the weight of Skan-
key fs testimony is wholly irrelevant to assessing the weight and 
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credibility of Wherry's testimony. Even if determining the 
weight of Skankey's testimony somehow had merit, comparing such 
weight with that given to Wherry's testimony is academic since 
their testimonies are concordant and supportive of each other. 
There is little substance, if any, to the two isolated 
inconsistencies that the Sines attribute to Wherry's testimony. 
First, contrary to the Sines' contentions, Wherry's testimony 
that he would use his best efforts to extend the same lease terms 
an additional fifteen years is consonant with his statement that 
he could not guarantee the lease extension. Best efforts does 
not guarantee a promised result. The parties unquestionably 
understood the symmetry of Wherry's testimony that his best 
efforts merely comprised a promise on his part that the would 
make a good faith attempt to help secure a favorable lease 
extension to the Sines. (T. 57, 61-62). As Sine testified, he 
knew as an attorney that he could have, but did not, insert 
language in the Stock Purchase Agreement that would require 
Wherry to secure the lease extension. (T. 161-62). Wherry's 
testimony would only have been inconsistent with his "best-
efforts" promise had he testified of guaranteeing the Sines an 
extension of the Wherry lease terms. 
Second, Wherry's testimony regarding the meetings and 
discussions he had with Skankey also fully comports with Skan-
key fs version of events. Both witnesses testified that they met 
in at least 1979 and 1984 to discuss extending the Sines' lease 
with the same terms as had existed between Wherry and Skankey. 
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(T. 26, 60-62, 65, 89, 91-93 & 104). Both witnesses also testi-
fied that they had discussions concerning the lease extension 
over the telephone as well as face to face. (T. 36-37 & 92). 
The fact that the witnesses were unable to mutually pinpoint the 
precise numbers of times they met is of no significance in light 
of their accord regarding their primary meetings, discussions and 
the substance of their conversations. 
The Sines' final point that Wherry's testimony is suspect 
because of his inability to recall exact dates of telephone calls 
and casual conversations with Skankey is, again, devoid of any 
merit. It is difficult for any witness to recall with precision 
the date on which they had a telephone call or casual conversa-
tion with another. Given Wherry's age and the time frame of his 
conversations with Skankey, Wherry's recollection was impressive. 
The overall consistency, detail and substance of Wherry's testi-
mony renders any memory lapse of exact dates and times of no 
consequence. 
In sum, the record conclusively shows that Wherry's testimo-
ny is internally consistent, and fully comports with Skankey's 
testimony. The Sines resort to isolated examples of alleged 
incongruities and contradictions that, when put into context, are 
of little importance to the overall credibility of Wherry's 
testimony. It is the trial court's prerogative to weigh a 
witnesses' testimony. Beyond alleging only a few so-called 
inconsistencies, the Sines fail to show that the trial court 
abused its discretion in finding Wherry's testimony credible. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
WHERRY EMPLOYED HIS BEST EFFORTS 
AS REQUIRED BY THE STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
In their second point, the Sines argue that the evidence 
does not support the trial courtf s conclusion that Wherry used 
his best efforts on behalf of the Sines to extend the Wherry 
lease terms that existed in the 1979 lease agreement between 
Wherry and Skankey. The Sines propose that "best efforts" 
required Wherry to have repeated meetings and discussions through 
the five-year period "until all efforts had been exhausted to 
complete the obligation of the Plaintiff [Wherry] to extend the 
lease on favorable terms." 
A. Standard of Review is "Clearly Erroneous" 
On appeal of a judgment from a bench trial, the appellate 
courts in Utah defer to the trial court's factual assessment and 
review its findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987); Copper State 
Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88, 93 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Utah Civ. Pro. 52(a) (1991). Findings of 
fact are only clearly erroneous if it can be shown that they "are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. 
B. The Sines Fail to Marshal the Evidence 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that "in subse-
quent cases, defendants [appellants] will be required to marshal 
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the evidence in support of the verdict in order to have their 
sufficiency of the evidence claims dealt with on the merits." 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This 
requirement follows the rule set forth from the Utah Supreme 
Court that in civil appeals from bench trials, Utah appellate 
courts require appellants to "marshal all evidence in support of 
the trial courtf s findings and then demonstrate that even viewing 
it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This requirement of marshaling 
the evidence is consistent with the broad deference owed to the 
fact finder at trial. Moore, 802 P.2d at 739. The consequence 
of the appellant's failure to marshal the evidence is well 
settled: "[i]f the appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, 
the appellate court need not consider the challenge to its 
sufficiency." Id. at 738-39. 
Because the Sines failed to marshal the evidence, their 
challenges to the trial court's factual findings can readily be 
disposed of. The Sines make arguments based solely on the facts 
as they presented them to the trial court, such as the importance 
Sine attached to the lease extension and a few isolated portions 
of Skankey's testimony that they mischaracterize. At no point do 
the Sines even discuss the detailed findings entered by the trial 
court to support its judgment that under the circumstances Wherry 
used his best efforts. The Sines have not even begun to carry the 
"heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence supporting the trial 
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court's detailed findings. Scharf, 700 P.2d at 1070, In accor-
dance with the court of appeal's explicit directive in Moore, the 
merits of the Sines' contention need not be addressed or consid-
ered on appeal. 
C. The Sines Fail to Address the Court's Finding 
that they Knowingly Waived any Claim Regard-
ing the Failure of Wherry's Performance Under 
the Stock Purchase Agreement 
The trial court determined that "Defendants [the Sines] 
knowingly waived any claim regarding the failure of Plaintiffs 
performance under the Stock Purchase Agreement."1 (See Conclu-
sion of Lawr ir3, attached as Addendum 2). This Court in Barnes v. 
Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), stated that "[w]hether 
a right has been waived is generally a question of fact and 
therefore we accord considerable deference to the finder of 
fact's determination." _Id. at 1230.2 To support its determina-
tion, the trial court made findings of fact that (1) the Sines 
made payments due under the Stock Purchase Agreement to Wherry 
xThe Sines' alleged claim would have accrued in 1984 when the 
lease agreement between Skankey and Wherry terminated and Sine 
negotiated a new lease agreement with Skankey. 
2With respect to waiver, the Utah Supreme Court has held: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of 
a known right. To constitute a waiver, there 
must be an existing right, benefit or advan-
tage, a knowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it. It must be dis-
tinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied. 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (1983); see also B.R. Woodward 
Mktg. v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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from the date of execution of the Agreement in 1979 through May 
of 1988; and (2) at no time prior to October 11, 1988, did the 
Sines give notice to or advise Wherry that they were not satis-
fied with his efforts in securing an extension of the Wherry 
lease on their behalf nor that payments under the Stock Purchase 
Agreement would be withheld by reason of Wherry's inability to 
secure such extension. (See Findings of Fact 1Mfl3 & 15, attached 
as Addendum 2). 
The Sines do not even address the trial court's determina-
tion that the Sines knowingly waived their failure-to-use "best-
efforts" claim, let alone contend on appeal that the trial 
court's findings of facts are insufficient to support its deter-
mination. By affirming the trial court's findings and subsequent 
judgment that the Sines waived any claim regarding the failure of 
Wherry's use of "best efforts" under the Stock Purchase Agree-
ment, this Court has further reason to not reach the merits of 
the Sines' failure to use "best-efforts" contention . 
D. Trial Court Did Not Err in Determining That 
Wherry Used His Best Efforts 
Contrary to the Sines' representation, there is some author-
ity in Utah regarding what constitutes "best efforts." These 
few cases are in complete unison with federal cases that have 
more fully articulated what requirements "best efforts" impose. 
Based on these cases, the law is clear that "best efforts" is 
equivalent to "good faith" and requires a certain standard of 
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conduct or effort that depends on the circumstances of the parties. 
In Hanover Ltd, v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977), the 
Supreme Court viewed a "best efforts" promise as equivalent to a 
responsibility to exercise good faith. The trial court had found 
that the underlying condition of all the dealings of the parties 
was that mutual best efforts would be used to secure financing 
for the purchase of a condominium. The Supreme Court held that 
there was no evidence of the defendant holding back or an unwill-
ingness on her part to obtain financing that would indicate a 
lack of a good faith effort. .Id. at 752-53. 
In Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
this Court held that the clause calling for best efforts does not 
require the party to be successful in order to fulfill his 
contractual obligation. In that case there was a promise by one 
party to use his "best efforts" to substitute himself as an 
obligor on a first trust deed and note. The fact that the party 
was not successful in doing so was not a bar to enforcement of 
the agreement. 
The federal cases also uniformly hold that "best efforts" is 
analogous to "good faith." As noted by the First Circuit Court, 
"[w]e have been unable to find any case in which a court found, 
as here, thcit a party acted in good faith but did not use its 
best efforts." Triple-A Baseball Club Assoc, v. Northeastern 
Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 225 (1st Cir. 1987). The equiva-
lency of "beist efforts" to "good faith, " precludes deciding in a 
vacuum whether a party exercised its "best efforts." The term 
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"best efforts" is fluid and as such requires a different level of 
performance and effort depending on the circumstances. As one 
federal court recently articulated: 
Federal courts also have acknowledged that 
the term "best efforts" "cannot be defined in 
terms of a fixed formula . . . [but] varies 
with the facts and the field of law involved" 
and is a "term which necessarily takes its 
meaning from the circumstances." 
NCNB Nat. Bank of N.C. v. Bridgewater Steam Power, 740 F. Supp. 
1140, 1151 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (quoting Triple-A Baseball Club 
Assoc., 832 F.2d at 225, cert, denied, 485 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 
1111, 99 L.Ed.2d 272 (1988). The cases the Sines cite also 
support this legal doctrine that "best efforts" is wholly depen-
dent on the circumstances. See Joyce Beverages of N.Y., Inc. v. 
Royal Crown Cola, 555 F. Supp. 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);3 Bloor 
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F.Supp. 258, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 
aff'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2nd Cir. 1979). The circumstances to be 
considered include "a party's experience, expertise, financial 
status, opportunities, and other abilities." NCNB Nat. Bank of 
3The Sines cite Joyce for the proposition in their brief thar 
"mere 'even efforts1" is not sufficient to avoid a breach of 
contract claim." (Brief p. 12). When put into context this phrase 
"even efforts" makes sense and is in complete accord with Wherry's 
position. The issue in Joyce was whether a soft drink bottler's 
acceptance of a license and franchise to distribute a competing 
cola product constituted a material breach of its obligation under 
the "best efforts" clause of its original cola products franchise 
agreement. Joyce argued that it would be able to protect the 
interests of its original cola franchise and the new franchise 
"evenhandedly." The court determined, however, that Joyce could 
not take on a competing cola product and still promote the original 
cola franchise "evenhandedly, much less with its best efforts 
focused on its best interests under the circumstances." Joyce 
Beverages of N.Y., Inc., 555 F.Supp. at 276 (emphasis added). 
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N.C., 740 F.Supp. at 1151; see also Triple-A Baseball Club Assoc. 
v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 655 F.Supp. 513, 540 (D.Me.), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 832 F.2d 214 (1st 
Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 1111, 99 
L.Ed.2d 272 (1988); Bloor, 454 F.Supp. at 267. Further, as 
stated by Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt Assoc, 584 F.2d 1164 
(2d Cir. 1978), which the Sines also cite, where a party encoun-
ters difficult problems in carrying out the terms of a contract, 
no breach of a "best efforts" clause occurs. _Id. at 1171-72.4 
These cases present a different picture of what "best 
efforts" constitutes than what the Sines advance in their brief. 
"Best efforts" does not require a party, as the Sines state, to 
exert themselves until "all efforts have been exhausted." As 
Triple-A Baseball Club states: "We have found no cases, and none 
have been cited, holding that 'best efforts' means every conceiv-
able effort . . . ." Id. at 228. Best efforts is tantamount to 
4The Sines cite Western Geophysical Co. for its statement that 
"best efforts" means "active exploitation in good faith. . . . " 
Id. at 1171. This phrase was taken from a 1911 federal district 
court opinion and was quoted by the second circuit in Western 
Geophysical Co. as a reference to what the trial judge used as a 
standard of "best efforts." When put into context with the 
circumstances involved in the case, the phrase "active exploitation 
in good faith" was a sensible standard in Western Geophysical Co. 
for "best efforts" and in no way, contrary to the Sines' argument, 
posits a static formula of what constitutes "best efforts." 
Western Geophysical Co. involved an exclusive licensing agreement 
that required Western "to use it best efforts to promote worldwide 
licensing and use" of a Pneumatic Acoustical Repeater. The second 
circuit agreed with the trial court that "best efforts" under the 
circumstances in the case constituted active exploitation in good 
faith. The appellate court also affirmed that the trial court's 
finding that Western used its best efforts by acting "in complete 
good faith" and by exercising "sound business judgment" throughout 
the licensing period. Ld. at 1170-72. 
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good faith and therefore what constitutes best efforts in any 
given case depends on the circumstances. NCNB Nat. Bank of N.C., 
740 F.Supp. at 1151. 
In this case, the trial court properly accounted for the 
circumstances and made applicable findings that are uncontested 
by the Sines on appeal. First, the court considered the nature 
of Wherry's promise and the subsequent expectations of the 
parties. Its findings included that (1) the parties understood 
that Wherry gave no guarantee that Skankey would extend the same 
lease terms to the Sines; (2) Sine was aware he could have 
required language mandating the lease extension as a condition 
precedent to their performance under the Stock Purchase Agree-
ment; and (3) at no time prior to October 11, 1988, did Sine give 
notice to or advise Wherry that the Sines were not satisfied with 
his efforts in securing an extension of the Wherry lease nor that 
payments under the Stock Purchase Agreement would be withheld by 
reason of Wherry's inability to secure such an extension. (See 
Findings of Fact 1Mf7, 8 & 15, attached as Addendum 2). 
The trial court also evaluated the parties' experience, 
expertise, opportunities and other abilities. Its findings 
included that 1) Sine was a member of the Utah State Bar; 2) 
there was nothing Wherry could have done from 1979 to 1984 which 
would have resulted in different or more favorable terms than 
those contained in the lease subsequently negotiated and executed 
between Skankey and Sine; 3) at all times after 1979, Sine was in 
a better position to negotiate an extension of the lease than was 
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Wherry; and 4) the only influence Wherry had to bring to bear on 
the negotiations was whatever good faith existed between himself 
and Skankey. (See Findings of Fact tf8, 10 & 11, attached as 
Addendum 2). 
Finally, the trial court assessed the difficult problems 
Wherry encountered in carrying out his promise to use his "best 
efforts." Its findings included that 1) expenses attributable to 
the maintenance of the shopping center and other economic factors 
changed significantly between the date of the execution of the 
Stock Purchase Agreement and August 31, 1984; and 2) because of 
these economic factors, Wherry's efforts could not have done 
anything to influence Skankey in extending the Wherry lease terms 
to the Sines. (See Finding of Fact if 11, attached as Addendum 2). 
Under these carefully measured circumstances, the court 
found that Wherry's meeting with Skankey three times in 1979 and 
at least one time in 1984 in an effort to obtain an extension of 
the Wherry lease on behalf of the Sines constituted "best ef-
forts" under the Stock Purchase Agreement. (See Finding of Fact 
1f9 & Conclusion of Law 1f2, attached as Addendum 2). The trial 
court's decision certainly comports with the principles of good 
faith as laid out by the courts in Utah and other jurisdictions 
that have addressed what requirements "best efforts" impose. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's comprehensive and meticulous findings 
of facts withstand the Sines' contention that the trial court 
abused its discretion in finding Wherry's testimony credible and 
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that Wherry used his "best efforts" as required by the Stock 
Purchase Agreement. For the reasons set forth above, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects and 
award appellees their costs. 
DATED t h i s 3/^ay of May, 1 9 9 1 . 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSION 
CLARK W. 
MICHAEL T. ROBERT 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main, Suite 
400, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said capacity and pursuant 
to Rule 21(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, four (4) 
true and correct copies of the Brief of Appellees were served 
upon: 
Dean H. Becker 
349 South 200 East, #170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by hand delivery, this ^ > ; day of May, 1991. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESS 
CtfSRK W. SESSIONS 
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS 
22 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CLARK L. SNELSON (4673) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1605 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Civil Action, File Number 880907336CN 
T. E. WHERRY, T. E. WHERRY, ! 
JR., JAMES I. WHERRY, ! 
custodian, ANITA I. WHERRY, s 
custodian, GAYLE W. JENSEN, > 
JEFFREY E. JENSEN, custodian, i 
SEAN D. JENSEN, custodian, : 
JESSICA A. JENSEN, custodian, : 
Plaintiffs, \ 
VS . ! 
WESLEY F. SINE, MELVA CAROL i 
SINE, JERRY SINE and DORA SINE,! 
JUDGMENT 
: Judge Michael R. Murphy 
s 
Defendants. : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before 
the Court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, 
presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and the Court 
having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiffs have and recover of and from the 
Defendants Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine, the sum of 
$162,964,63, and 
2. That the Plaintiffs have and recover from the Defendants 
Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine, the sum of $8,255.75, repre-
senting Plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs, and 
3. That the amount of this Judgment shall bear interest at 
the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum as by law provided, 
and, 
4. That the Counterclaim of the Defendants Wesley F. Sine 
and Melva Carol Sine, be and the same is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice, and on the merits, and that the Defendants Wesley F. 
Sine and Melva Carol Sine shall take nothing thereby. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this CNJ1^ day of Mageh, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
_JL 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \L[ & day of March, 1990, the 
foregoing JUDGMENT was served on Defendants Wesley F. Sine and 
Carol Melva Sine by hand delivering a true and correct copy 
thereof by first class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Dean H. Becker, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(vwLd&w 
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CLARK L. SNELSON (467 3) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1605 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
T. E. WHERRY, T. E. WHERRY, : 
JR., JAMES I. WHERRY, : 
custodian, ANITA I. WHERRY, i 
custodian, GAYLE W. JENSEN, i 
JEFFREY E. JENSEN, custodian, i 
SEAN D. JENSEN, custodian, ! 
JESSICA A. JENSEN, custodian, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 




I Judge Michael R. Murphy 
WESLEY F. SINE, MELVA CAROL : 
SINE, JERRY SINE and DORA SINE,: 
Defendants. : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
pursuant to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of 
the above-entitled Court on Friday, March 2, 1990, and concluding 
Wednesday, March 7, 1990. The Plaintiff T.E. Wherry was present 
in person and the Plaintiffs were represented by Clark W. 
Sessions and Clark L. Snelson of Campbell Maack & Sessions, their 
attorneys. The Defendant Wesley F. Sine was present in person 
and said Defendant and Melva Carol Sine were represented by Dean 
H. Becker, their attorney. The Defendants Jerry Sine and Dora 
Sine had previously filed a petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for Utah and the above-entitled matter as to 
said Defendants was stayed. The Court heard and considered the 
testimony of the witnesses, the documents and writings offered 
and received, the arguments and statements of counsel, including 
the written memoranda filed in connection therewith, and having 
taken the matter under advisement now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on March 31, 1961, the Plaintiff T.E. Wherry and 
Lucile M. Wherry, his wife, executed a lease agreement as lessees 
with Skaggs Properties, Inc. as lessor (herein the "Wherry 
Lease") and that pursuant to the Wherry Lease, Plaintiff T.E. 
Wherry assumed possession of a certain building known as the 
Wasatch Bowling Lanes in the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That the Wherry Lease remained in full force and effect 
during the term thereof until May 4, 1971, when it was extended 
by mutual written agreement of the parties to August 31, 1984. 
3. That prior to November, 1978, the Plaintiff T.E. Wherry 
and the Defendant Wesley F. Sine became acquainted with each 
other through a trade association and discussions ensued 
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concerning the possibility of the Defendants acquiring the 
Plaintiff's bowling establishment and business. 
4. That such negotiations continued between the parties and 
resulted in the execution of a Stock Purchase Agreement on or 
about February 5, 1979. 
5. That the Stock Purchase Agreement required, among other 
things, that the Plaintiffs use their best efforts to obtain an 
extension of the Wherry Lease on the same terms and conditions 
for the benefit of the Defendants at the expiration of the term 
of the Wherry Lease as extended, August 31, 1984. 
6. That all parties understood and agreed that the 
Plaintiff T.E. Wherry was acting for and on behalf of all 
Plaintiffs in connection with the Stock Purchase Agreement and 
subsequent negotiations with management of the shopping center 
with respect to the extension of the Wherry Lease. 
7. That all parties understood that the Plaintiffs were in 
no way guaranteeing that the shopping center management as lessor 
would grant an extension of the Wherry Lease to the Defendants 
or enter into a new lease agreement with the Defendants on the 
same terms and conditions as previously existed between the 
Plaintiffs and the lessor. 
8. That the negotiations of the parties with respect to the 
Stock Purchase Agreement were conducted in part by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Richard H. Moffat, Esq. and Wesley Sine on behalf of the 
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Defendants, Mr, Sine being a member of the Utah State Bar. 
Further, that had the securing of a lease extension been critical 
to the Stock Purchase Agreement, Defendant Wesley F. Sine was 
aware that he could have required language mandating that result 
and in addition, could have made the obtaining of the lease 
extension a condition precedent to Defendants' performance under 
the Stock Purchase Agreement. 
9. That the testimony on behalf of the Plaintiffs by the 
Plaintiff T.E. Wherry was believable, credible, forthright and 
honest. Further, the Plaintiff T.E. Wherry met with Mr. Richard 
Skancky, a principal of the management of the Olympus Hills 
Shopping Center owner three times in 1979 and at least one time 
in 1984 in an effort to obtain an extension of the Wherry Lease 
or securing a new lease containing similar favorable terms on 
behalf of the Defendants. 
10. That there was nothing that the Plaintiffs could have 
done from 1979 through 1984 which would have resulted in 
different or more favorable terms than those contained in the 
lease subsequently negotiated and executed between the Defendants 
and the owner of the Olympus Hills Shopping Center; furthermore, 
that significant and substantial remodeling efforts were 
undertaken by the Defendants as a part of such new lease and 
costs and expenses attributable to the maintenance of the 
shopping center and other economic factors changed significantly 
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between the date of the execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement 
and August 31, 1984, 
11. That at all times after 1979, the Defendant Wesley F. 
Sine was in a better position to negotiate an extension of the 
Wherry Lease than were the Plaintiffs and the only influence the 
Plaintiffs had to bring to bear on the negotiations was whatever 
good faith existed between the Plaintiff T. E. Wherry and the 
owner of the Olympus Hills Shopping Center. 
12. That the Plaintiff T. E. Wherry, his wife (since 
deceased) and family corporation were released from the Wherry 
Lease following the execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement. 
13. That the Defendants made payments due under the Stock 
Purchase Agreement to the Plaintiffs from the date of execution 
of the Stock Purchase Agreement, through May, 1988, when a 
partial payment for the month of June, 1988 was made. 
14. That the Defendants did not intend to make any further 
payments under the Stock Purchase Agreement. 
15. That at no time prior to October 11, 1988, did the 
Defendant Wesley F. Sine give notice to or advise the Plaintiffs 
that the Defendants were not satisfied with the Plaintiffs' 
efforts in securing an extension of the Wherry Lease on behalf 
of the Defendants nor that payments under the Stock Purchase 
Agreement would be withheld by reason of the Plaintiffs' 
inability to secure such extension. 
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16. That there remains due and owing under the Stock 
Purchase Agreement to the Plaintiffs from the Defendants Wesley 
F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine, the total sum of $162,964.63, which 
includes interest through the date of execution hereof. 
17. That the bowling business of the Defendants conducted 
at the Wasatch Lanes seriously declined, which decline was not 
attributable to the actions of the Plaintiffs and which decline 
resulted in the Defendants default under their lease and 
subsequent eviction from the Olympus Hills Shopping Center. 
18. That Plaintiffs were required to retain the services of 
attorneys to prosecute the above-entitled action and that 
Plaintiffs' attorneys fees are reasonable and were necessarily 
incurred in the prosecution of the above-entitled action and are 
awardable pursuant to the express terms of the Stock Purchase 
Agreement. 
19. That the Counterclaim of the Defendants is without 
factual or legal support. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The above-entitled action is stayed as to the Defendants 
Jerry Sine and Dora Sine pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 
11 USC S 362(a). 
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2. Plaintiffs fully performed their duties and 
responsibilities under the Stock Purchase Agreement and used 
their best efforts to obtain an extension of the Wherry Lease on 
behalf of Defendants. 
3. Defendants knowingly waived any claim regarding the 
failure of Plaintiffs performance under the Stock Purchase 
Agreement. 
4. Defendants are not and were not justified in withholding 
payments under the Stock Purchase Agreement and their intentional 
refusal to make future payments constitutes a breach of the Stock 
Purchase Agreement. 
5. That Plaintiffs have been damaged and injured by 
Defendants' breach of the Stock Purchase Agreement in the amount 
of $162f381.43 plus interest thereon in the amount of $36.45 per 
diem until the entry of judgment herein. 
6. That Plaintiffs are entitled to be awarded judgment in 
their favor and against the Defendants in the amount of 
$162,381.43 together with interest as aforesaid and attorneys 
fees and costs in the amount of $8,255.95. 
7. That the Counterclaim of the Defendants should be 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
8. That the Court should make and enter its judgment 
accordingly. 
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DATED this day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
j 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the f 7 '' day of March, 1990, the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW were served on 
Defendants Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine by hand delivering 
a true and correct copy thereof by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Dean H. Becker, Esq, 
Attorney for Defendants 
6540 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
• C - k k - . 
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DATED this day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
qrL> 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the II day of March, 1990, the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW were served on 
Defendants Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine by hand delivering 
a true and correct copy thereof by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Dean H. Becker, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
pf\ .C.UIL- O.-Usfa 
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STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into on w 
h 
T. E. Wherry, T. E. Wherry, Jr., James I. Wherry, Anita I. V>; 
the / > / day of r*cfr\ru&fL^ / 19 79, by and between^ ~p\ 
Wherry, Gayle W. Jensen, Jeffrey E. Jensen, Sean D. Jensen and 
Jessica A. Jensen, hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Sellers," and Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, his wife, and Wesley F. 
Sine and Melva Carol Sine, his wife, hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Buyers," 
WHEREAS, Wasatch Bowling, Inc., hereinafter referred to as 
the "Corporation," is a corporation organized under the laws of 
the State of Utah, having its principal place of business at 
4015 Wasatch Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah; and 
WHEREAS, the only voting stock of the Corporation is the 
common stock of which 200 shares are issued and outstanding; and 
WHEREAS, the Sellers own the following amounts of such 
stock: 
T. E. Wherry, Jr. 50 Shares 
James I. Wherry 15 Shares 
Anita I. Wherry 15 Shares 
Gayle W. Jensen 50.Shares 
Jeffrey E. Jensen 10 Shares 
Sean D. Jensen 10 Shares 
T. E. Wherry 40 Shares 
Jessica A. Jensen 10 Shares 
and 
WHEREAS, the Buyers desire to purchase all of said stock and 
the Sellers are willing to sell, 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual cove-
nants and conditions herein contained, and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowl-
edged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
LAW OFFICES OP 
MOFFAT. WELLING & PAULSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
• T H FLOOR T R I D U N E B U I L D I N G 
1 4 3 S O U T H MAIN STREET 
S A L T L A K E r i T V I IT4W fl/?Hl 
1. Sellers hereby sell and transfer to Buyers 200 shares, 
comprising all of the outstanding shares of the Corporation, for 
a total payment in the sum of $435,000.00, payable as follows: 
the sum of $3 5,000.00 down, upon execution of this Agreement, the 
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, with the balance of 
$400,000.00 to be payable in monthly payments on the first day of 
each and every month, commencing March 1, 19 79, for a period of 
fifteen years, in monthly payments of*$3,598.92 for the first 
two years, which represents interest on the unpaid balance at the 
rate of 9% per annum, and after the payment of twenty-four pay-
ments, at the monthly rate of $4,728.56, which represents inter-
est on the unpaid balance at 9 1/2% per annum, until the total-e~ 
180 monthly paymentc—shall have boon made,—and the- contract 4 ?•• ' 
balance of $400,000.00, plus interest, is paid in full. v-—__ 
2. Sellers reserve the right to accept only such amount in 
prepayment on the contract as they, in their sole discretion, may 
agree upon, but in no event shall more than 29% of the total 
purchase price be received by Sellers during the first year of 
the term of this Agreement. 
3. Buyers agree to assume the balance due on a Contract . 
of Purchase for the bowling equipment, said agreement being dated 
t h e
 3^ ' day of {^c^UsvY' ' 19H2zi' bY a n d between W^^f 
Wasatch Bowling, Inc., or T. E. Wherry, and AMF Corporation, 'fei/Q;p 
which has a balance of $ H @, P(X c °^ t plus accrued interestrJC^v ', 
/ 0t^> 
and Buyers agree to substitute themselves or others satisfactory 
to AMF as guarantors thereon, and to relieve Mr. T. E. Wherry 
from any guarantees on account of said obligation. 
4. The Purchasers agree to substitute themselves or other 
persons satisfactory to the landlord and to Sellers as guarantors 
of any and all obligations, including the lease on the premises, 
LAW OFFICES OF 
MOFFAT. WELLING & PAULSEN 
A PftOFESStONAk CORPORATION 
BTH FLOOR T R I B U N E BUILDING 
1 4 3 S O U T H MAIN STREET 
A 
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which obligations are currently guaranteed by Mr. T. E. Wherry, 
and to relieve him entirely thereof. 
5. Included within the purchase price shall be all 
inventory on the premises, maintained at its normal level, as 
now established. Excluded therefrom are all of the tools and 
other personal belongings owned by Mr. T. E. Wherry which were 
not purchased by the Corporation and which Mr. Wherry will re-
move from the premises within twenty-four hours of the execution 
of this Agreement. 
6. It is acknowledged by the parties that the Buyers have 
reviewed the books and records of the Corporation prior to the 
execution of this Agreement, and are satisfied with the facts 
and figures revealed therein. 
7. The possession of the business by the Buyers shall take 
place at beginning of business on the / day of l^~7 c^ w"" 
j^dujis+ys' , 19 79. /^&%j 
8. As of the date of possession by the Buyers, all bank :-/-> 
accounts of the business shall be reduced to zero, and the sums 
therein shall remain the property of T. E. Wherry, and all trade 
accounts shall be paid current to that date, and all accounts 
receivable as of that date shall belong to Mr. T. E. Wherry. 
The Buyers agree to cooperate with Mr. Wherry in collecting said 
accounts and in the event any are paid to them, which belong to 
Mr. Wherry, they agree to promptly remit the same to him. 
9* The parties aaree that for a period of one vear from 
the date hereof, the stock of Wasatch Bowlina. Inc. shall be 
placed in a satisfactory escrow, at the expense of the Buyers. 
with instructions that the Buyers may vote the shares for all 
purposes so loner as the Stock Purchase Aqreement between the 
Sellers and the Buyers is current. In the event the Stock 
Purchase Aqreement is not current. Mr. T. E. Wherry shall have 
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the riqht to vote the stock so held in escrow for all purposes 
until the contract is made current. In the event of default, 
after fifteen day's notice and said default not havinq been 
cured, upon demand bv the Sellers, the escrow aqent shall 
redeliver the stock to Sellers and the Stock Purchase Agreement 
shall be terminated, and the Sellers shall be entitled to 
possession of the business. 
10. The Buyers hereunder do hereby personally guarantee 
to pay the unpaid purchase price, as provided herein, and do 
further agree to provide a second mortgage or second trust deed 
upon the property located in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, known 
as "Scotty's Travel Motel," upon which the Buyers represent, 
knowing that the Sellers rely thereon, that there is a first 
trust deed or mortgage obligation of no more than $249,191.06. 
It is further agreed that the second mortgage or trust deed 
given to secure the terms of this Agreement shall be and remain 
a valid second obligation against the property until the first 
obligation is paid, according to its terms, without any renewal 
or extension thereof, at which time the obligations running in 
favor of the Sellers will become a first obligation against said 
property and will remain so until the balance under this Agree-
ment is paid in full. 
11. All payments provided for herein shall be made to 
Mr. T. E. Wherry at 875 Donner Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, who 
shall act as agent for all of the Sellers. Any change of agent 
for the Sellers must be furnished to the Buyers by notice in 
writing, mailed to the business address at 4015 Wasatch Boulevard, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
12. In the event it becomes necessary to enforce any of the 
terms of this Agreement, the party found to be in default agrees 
to pay all costs of enforcement, including a reasonable attorney's 
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ADDENDUM TO STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS ADDENDUM to "Stock Purchase Agreement" dated 
February 5, 1979, by and between T. E. Wherry, T. E. Wherry, Jr., 
James I. Wherry, Anita I. Wherry, Gayle W. Jensen, Jeffrey E. 
Jensen, Sean D. Jensen and Jessica A. Jensen, hereinafter refer-
red to as "Sellers," and Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, his wife, 
and Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine, his wife, hereinafter 
referred to as "Buyers," WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the above-named parties are about to enter 
into said "Stock Purchase Agreement," but desire to modify the 
terms of said instrument without rewriting that agreement. 
NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto hereby make this 
a part of said "Stock Purchase Agreement" in the same manner 
and to the same force and effect as if the terms and conditions 
of this instrument were written into and were a part thereof, 
provided however that to the extent (if at all) that the terms 
of this instrument are inconsistent with the terms of said "Stock 
Purchase Agreement," the terms of this instrument shall govern 
and determine the agreement between the parties. Accordingly, 
the parties further agree as follows: r\ 
13. Attached hereto as exhibit "A" is a balance sheet^ fc/ 
of the "Corporation" as of the T<^~ day of ^ L ^ ^ V ^ / A ^ / 197,-<" . *V". 
"7< u 
Sellers hereby warrant and represent that said balance sheet shoVsV'' 
the financial position of said corporation as of said date in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; that 
there have been no material changes in the financial position of 
the corporation since that date and that there will be no material 
changes therein to and including the date upon which buyers obtain 
possession of said corporation and its assets; that there are no 
debts or obligations owed by said corporation, including contingent 
obligations, which are not shown on said balance sheet; and that 
said corporation is the owner of the assets shown thereon, free 
and clear of liens or encumberances, except as disclosed herein. 
The parties acknowledge that the assets and liabilities of said 
corporation will be modified by the acts contemplated by paragraph 
#8 of said "Stock Purchase Agreement/ but that no other change 
therein will occur except in the usual course of business of 
said corporation to that date. Sellers contract and agree that 
said corporation will be free and clear of debt, obligations or 
claims of any person or organization, including taxes, etc., as 
of the date of closing, and agree to indemnify and hold buyers 
harmless from any and all claims of any nature whatosever which 
may hereafter be asserted against said corporation for acts and 
events which occur to and including the date of closing, other 
than the debts and obligations expressly assumed by buyers as 
specified in said "Stock Purchase Agreement." In the event that 
claims are asserted for income taxes or other such claims which 
pertain in part to the period before possession by buyers and in 
part to the period after possession by buyers, the parties agree 
to pro-rate said claims or expenses according to the period involved 
before and after date of possession. Buyers shall have the right 
to terminate, if they so desire, the sub-chapter "S" election 
concerning income taxes and/or the right to dissolve the corpora-
tion. In the event that this is done buyers agree to provide the 
sellers with the same security interest in any new entity or in 
the assets received from that liquidation as is provided in 
paragraph #9 of the "Stock Purchase Agreement." 
14. Sellers contract, warrant and represent: 
(a) That the corporation is in good standing with 
the State of Utah, and that it possesses all of the power, licenses 
and authority necessary to operate the businesses being conducted 
on its premises. 
(b) That the sellers are the owners of all of the 
issued and outstanding capital stock of the Corporation; that 
they have full right, power and authority to sell and to convey 
said stock to buyers, free and clear of the claims or rights of 
any other person or organization; and that they have full power 
and authority to enter into this contract and to do the acts 
specified herein. 
(c) That there are no lawsuits, governmental investiga-
tions, tax audits or other proceedings pending or threatened 
against the corporation according to the best of sellers knowledge. 
15. The parties expect to make a physical inventory of 
the personal property of the corporation which, when completed, 
will be attached to and become a part of this agreement, as exhibit 
"D". Sellers agree that all corporate personal property customarily 
and ordinarily used in the operation of the businesses of the 
corporation on the corporate premises which are necessary to the 
operation of said businesses are now present on said premises and 
are owned by the corporation; that said personal property will 
remain on the premises and will be delivered to buyer when possession 
of said premises is given to buyers hereunder, and are included in 
this transactions. Sellers warrant that they are the owners of 
all of said property, free and clear of liens or encumberances, 
except as noted and specified in said "Stock Purchase Agreement." 
16. Buyers agree that they will pay and discharge the 
following liens against the "Scotty's Travel Motel" mentioned in 
paragraph #10 of said "Stock Purchase Agreement:" 
(a) 1977 property taxes $582.50 - #77-03-1974 
(b) 1977 property taxes $1,599.32 - #77-03-1975 
(c) 1977 property taxes $1,041.69 - #77-03-1976 
(d) 1977 property taxes $2,130.57 - #77-03-1981 
17. Under the terms of paragraph #3 and 4 of said 
"Stock Purchase Agreement" buyers have an obligation to assume 
and pay certain debts and obligations of the corporation and to 
cause sellers to be released from liability thereunder. Said 
paragraphs are hereby modified to provide that buyers will use 
their best efforts to cause sellers to be released from liability 
thereunder, but that if such cannot be accomplished at this time 
that they will continue to use reasonable efforts to cause said 
release to be effected as soon as it can reasonably be accomplished; 
that buyers agree to indemnify and hold sellers harmless from 
liability which may be sustained or loss which may be incurred 
by sellers in the event that any of said assumed obligations 
are not paid and discharged by the corporation or by buyers. 
18. Sellers agree to use their best efforts to obtain 
an extension of the lease mentioned in paragraph #4 for a period 
of an additional 15 years, to and including the year 1999, on 
the terms and conditions heretofore discussed between sellers 
and the landlord as disclosed by sellers to buyers. A copy of 
the lease date March 31, 1961, is attached hereto as exhibit "B", 
and a copy of the modification to said lease dated May 4, 1971, 
is annexed hereto as exhibit "C". Sellers warrant and agree 
that the lease represented by exhibits "B" and "C" annexed hereto 
are in good standing and full force and effect under the terms 
and conditions contained therein with no other modifications 
thereto at this time. 
19. For a period of one year from date hereof buyers 
agree to keep all of the assets of the corporation insured in 
an amount sufficient to replace those items of personal property, 
with a carrier satisfactory to seller, with seller named as an 
additional named insured, and to furnish sellers with a certificate 
of said insurance. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the p a r t i e s h e r e t o have execu ted t h i s 
Stock Purchase Agreement t h e day and yea r f i r s t above w r i t t e n . 
SELLERS: „ , .-
BUYERS: 
• ' . / ' - - • • - ) ? 
T. E. Wher ry 
T. E. W h e r r y , J r . 
J a m e s I . i 'Wherry y ^ r ^ '-{>(js>n. /° 
-n* 
'Anita I . Wherry ijCzL /• Q.s*i./*-
GayleyW. J ensen 
J e f f r e y E.y J e n s e n ^ ^ a ? yt/^L U±?L/:LLA 
Sean D. J e n s e n ^ ; ^ r ^ 6U£Ji tOs^M.r*. 
J e s s i c a A.JJensen^^L?^U t/MJ^J-d.M. 
^ 
Dora S ine 
'CSl/iL^ 7? 
Wesley F. S i n e / 
Melva Carol Sine 
^••L^L. 
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